On Thursday, the Congressional Budget Office issued its cost estimate of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, finding it would create a $1.2 trillion cap-and-trade market through 2018 in carbon allowances, $946 billion of which in the form of corporate giveaways that would become windfall profits. Because of the failure of the legislation to account for the effect of the system on receipts from income and payroll taxes, the CBO estimated that the bill would generate a $15 billion budget deficit over the first ten years, with greater than $5 billion in deficits each decade following.
Because ownership of the allowances is not limited to emitters, the CBO interpreted the emissions allowances as the equivalent of a revenue-generating tax. Allowances given away are interpreted as “direct spending” – that is, revenues lost (“CBO considers the distribution of such allowances at no charge to be functionally equivalent to distributing cash”). Assuming enactment of the bill at the end of 2008,
CBO estimates that implementing this legislation would result in additional revenues, net of income and payroll tax offsets, of $304 billion over the 2009-2013 period, and about $1.19 trillion over the 2009-2018 period. We estimate that direct spending would increase by $281 billion and about $1.21 trillion over the same periods, respectively. Those changes in revenues and direct spending would stem almost entirely from the process of auctioning and freely distributing allowances under the cap-and-trade programs established under this legislation.
Over 78% of Market’s Value Dedicated to Polluter Giveaways Of the $1.2 trillion market, $260 billion is auctioned and $946 billion freely given to covered emitters. Because the CBO estimates that most of the cost of emissions reduction “would ultimately be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for energy and energy-intensive goods and services,” the $946 billion in emitter giveaways would become windfall profits. The effect on consumers is the same whether the allowances are given away or auctioned.
Banking’s Effect – Faster Reductions Up Front, Higher Allowance Value Furthermore, the CBO estimates that the unrestricted ability to “bank” emissions allowances (allowances distributed in one year may be redeemed at any time in the future) would encourage companies to attempt to “undertake significantly more mitigation than necessary to meet their annual emission caps” in early years because of the initially low allowance price and an expected rate of return “significantly greater than CBO’s estimate of the expected long-run inflation-adjusted rate of return to capital in the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector,” raising the price by about 27 percent higher than a no-banking policy over ten years.
Lion’s Share of Auction Revenues Go to Privately Controlled R&D The CBO estimates that in the first decade $123 billion, 47% of auction revenues, would go to the Climate Change Credit Corporation to allocate as it sees fit within its mission of funding industrial research and development – the corporation is set up as a private entity with a board selected by Presidential appointees.